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1.  Introduction
By analyzing the changes in central Tokyo (known as Edo during the feudal period)
from the mid-nineteenth century to the early twentieth century, this essay examines
issues that are now regarded as both commonsensical and inevitable in Japan.1)
Specifically, this essay questions the following phenomena: a strong preference for
single family housing and residential land ownership (no matter how small the lot)
and the intensive destruction and reconstruction of buildings in urban areas.  Both of
these common practices, I argue, derive from the surprisingly modern concept of
evaluating land as an “asset.”
2.  Residence in Edo2)
One of the strongest characteristics of Japan’s early modern cities, nearly all of
which were castle towns ( jo¯kamachi ) was the side-by-side co-existence of different
status-defined communities.  That is, cities were segmentalized into areas for retainers
and domain lords (bukechi ), areas for temples and shrines which included priests and
monks’ living spaces ( jishachi ), and areas for commoners (cho¯ninchi ), all of which
surrounded a lord’s castle.3) This segmental characteristic of castle towns is especially
easy to notice in the patch-work maps (kiriezu) that were used as portable guides
during the early modern period.  Besides the blue color for water and green for
vegetation, these maps also color-coded the three major kinds of residential areas as
follows: white for retainer and domain lord areas, red for temple and shrine areas, and
gray for commoner areas (see Figure 1).  In the city of Edo, Japan’s largest city and
one of the largest cities in the world at the time, nearly 70% of the total area was
occupied by retainers and domain lords with the remaining 30% been nearly evenly
divided between areas for commoner and for temple and shrines.4)
Though there was far more area for retainers and warriors, it was in the commoner
areas that the change to the modern era was most intensive and exhibited constantly
changing residential patterns.  While the expropriation of retainer and domain lord
areas and some temple and shrine areas by the new government brought about the
replacement of their inhabitants following the 1868 Meiji Restoration, the commoner
areas were handed down to their residents almost automatically because their “right of
exclusive possession” (senyu¯ken) was officially approved as “right to ownership”
(shoyo¯ken).5) Moreover, the commoner areas were smaller than retainer and domain
lord areas in Edo at the ratio of three to seven, but the commoner population was
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larger by the almost opposite ratio.  From the beginning of the Meiji period,
commercial activities that had been limited to the commoner’s quarters became the
driving force behind Tokyo’s economic and physical development.  Because the
significance of these centrally located commercial activities continues, and appears to
be even increasing, as a driving force behind the recent economic revival of Tokyo, I
believe it is important to examine how these one-time commoner areas changed
during the transition from the early modern to modern periods.
The Urban District (cho¯ )6)
The above mentioned patch-work maps suggests that how a city is depicted
provides us with important clues for understanding what kind of socio-spatial structure
a certain city has.  In addition to the citywide perspective provided by the patch-work
maps, there are also a number of smaller cadastral maps (kokenzu) that survive from
the early modern period.  These cadastral maps provide a detailed view of the spatial
organization of Edo’s urban districts or cho¯ (see Figure 2).  Moreover, because the
Tokugawa shogunate originally ordered the drafting of such maps, these detailed
depictions of neighborhoods throughout Edo also suggest the manner in which and
the depth to which the shogunate’s authority extended within the city, and perhaps
help explain why the Tokugawa regime managed to last for over 250 years.
Essentially, a single district or cho¯ is depicted on one cadastral map.  As with the
village (mura) in rural areas, the urban district (cho¯) was the main local community
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Figure 1: A portion of an 1861 patch-work map or kiriezu of Shibaguchi area just south of
central Edo. The all-white areas were occupied by warriors (bukechi), the dark grey
(actually red) areas are temple and shrine lands ( jishachi), and the light gray blocks are
the commoner districts (cho¯ninchi).（万延 2 年「芝口南西久保愛宕下之図」部分）
and also acted as the basic administrative unit of cities throughout Japan during this
period.  As suggested by remaining places names, such as Daiku-cho¯ (Carpenters
District) and Kajiya-cho¯ (Blacksmiths district) in the central part of Japanese cities,
these urban districts were originally organized as a permanent residential place for a
group of artisans or merchants in the same occupation at the beginning of the Edo
period, and formed the newly planned districts of the Tokugawa’s rapidly expanding
castle town in the early seventeenth century.
Generally speaking, each district was centered on a street that was lined by ten to
thirty residential lots (machiyashiki ), atop which stood one or two-story wood buildings
(see Figure 3).  Among these buildings, those facing the street and mixing retail and
residential functions were called omotedana (also frequently referred to as machiya).  As
I discuss later, beginning around the late-seventeenth century, most of the omotedana
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Figure 2: An example of Kokenzu (Kanpo Kokenzu), drafted in 1744.（日本橋・大伝馬町 1 丁目,
寛保 4 年）
were built and inhabited by land-tenants ( jigari).  The other kind of buildings
occupied the back lots behind the omotedana and were called uradana, whose cramped
quarters did not allow for storefronts.  Coterminous with the space of the lot
(machiyashiki ), these buildings were home to as many as twenty households and acted
as the elemental unit of all governing activities within Edo and other castle towns.7) It
was, for instance, down to the lot level that censuses, surveys, and notifications about
new laws were carried out.
As can be seen in the early-seventeenth century Edo meishozu byo¯bu (see Figure 4),8)
many of Edo’s urban districts originally had a high degree of social homogeneity due
to their being founded by artisans who typically worked in, lived in, and owned their
own lots.  From around the late seventeenth century, however, this situation had
dramatically changed with the influx of wealthy wholesale merchants from Osaka,
Kyoto, and provinces in the Kanto region.9) Originally having earned their wealth by
selling textiles, and other such high quality goods, these merchants eventually opened
stores in central Edo and began using their wealth to finance loans to daimyo lords
and high-ranking officials of the Tokugawa regime.  By the nineteenth century much
of the land in Edo, especially in the central area around Nihonbashi, had been bought
up by these immigrant merchants.  Having bought lots of Edo, these merchant
subsequently rented out either the land to “land-tenants” ( jigari ), who owned their
own building atop the rented lot, or rented out both the land and the building to
“building-tenants” (tanagari ).  Thus, by the nineteenth century, much of land in Edo’s
commoner areas was actually owned by non-resident owners who lived elsewhere in
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Figure 3: A model of the cho¯ . (retouched image from Sho¯setsu Nihonshi [詳説日本史], Tokyo:
Yamakawa Shuppansha, 2003)
the city or altogether in another city or region.  In fact, by the late-eighteenth to early-
nineteenth centuries, the row upon row of shophouses (machiya) along Nihonbashi
Avenue (Nihonbashi do¯ri ), depicted in great detail in the Kidai sho¯ran scroll painting,
were mostly operated by land-renting wholesale and intermediate merchants.10)
Yamori
Such changes in land ownership and residential patterns also posed numerous
difficulties for the governing structure of the city because they radically changed the
character of one of Edo’s fundamental social and administrative units, the urban
districts.  In early modern Japan, the administration of an urban district was carried
out by the landowning residents of that same district who were also officially
recognized as being of ‘property-holder’ or iemochi status that is, the Tokugawa
shogunate only formally recognized these commoners or cho¯nin, a term which
retained its primary meaning of owing a lot with residential buildings (ieyashiki or
machiyashiki ).11) All other residents as well as non-resident or absentee landowners
were excluded from district administration.
In response to changes such as the increase absentee landowners, a unique inter-
mediatory position of yamori developed to fulfill the various administrative needs of
landowners and renters.  A yamori was a caretaker who acted as both a resident agent
for a non-resident landowner and as a surrogate administrative leader within an urban
district.
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Figure 4: Edo meishozu byo¯bu: the date of scenery (景観年代) is presumed to be the early and
middle Kanei period (1624–44).  The machiya at the corner nearby Nihon-bashi, drawn
in the center, is for the trade of lacquer works.（『江戸名所図屏風』出光美術館蔵，
部分）
During the early modern era in Japan, there were just three categories of people in
terms of their usufruct rights to land and buildings in urabn areas: property-holders,
land-tenants, and building-tenants.  The yamori was not categorized as having such
usufruct rights.  The position of yamori was originally created by non-resident or
absentee landowners, who were fundamentally charged with performing the
administrative duties of their district.  These absentee landowners began
commissioning an inhabitant of the same urban district to manage their lot.  During
the first half of the nineteenth-century in the central part of Edo, for instance, only
about ten percent of the residential lots were actually occupied by their owner.  In
place of these landowners, however, there were 833 yamori for 1,010 lots, and the total
number of yamori in the city of Edo reached nearly 20,000.12)
In addition to the requirement that district administration be carried out by
property-holders who actually resided in the district, it was from among these
property-holders that a district headmen, or nanushi, representing upwards of five
districts, was chosen.  An unsalaried but prestigious title, the district headmen were
charged with among a number of duties communicating and negotiating with officials
in Edo’s City Magistrate Office (Machibugyo¯-sho).  Owing to a decreasing number of
resident property-holders, a number of documents from the early eighteenth century
show that the Tokugawa shogunate began to allow yamori to undertake a number of
district responsibilities such as the notification of official proclamations or the
conducting of district surveys.  Extant residency registries (ninbetsucho¯), for example,
also list residents by urban district and residential lot that often only named the
supervising yamori with no mention at all of the landowner who actually owned the
lot.13) These and other documents clearly suggest that, while the multitude of renting
commoners in Edo may have indirectly paid their rent to a nominal landlord, it was
the everyday presence of the supervising yamori with whom they had the most
contact.
Through the buying of lots by non-resident merchants from Osaka, Kyoto, and
other regions, the commoner areas lost their previous correlation between property-
holding status and residency.  As these land purchases continued, the number of
yamori increased in order to manage these lots, which brought them into positions of
district administration.  As noted above in addition to their initial duties of overseeing
the lots of their property-holding employers, the yamori also began increasingly to
represent their employers and the districts.  Recent research has revealed that, from
the late eighteenth century, the yamori also gained greater independence from their
employing property-holders.  For example, a yamori living in and overseeing a corner-
lot in Ise-cho¯ (north Nihonbashi) made his employer withdraw the demand for his
removal with the support of his tenants and all the other yamori in the district.14) In
another instance, after buying a new property, a landowner proved unable to remove
the resident yamori.15) By the nineteenth century, the yamori generally began to exert
greater control over district administration, and the position of yamori itself became a
well-established and licensed occupation (kabu) throughout Edo.
Situation during the last days of the Tokugawa Regime
The changes in the decades before the 1868 Meiji Restoration were tremendous.
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During the Tenpo¯ Reforms (1841–1843), the Tokugawa regime introduced extreme
measures to reduce land rents (chidai ) and building rents (tanachin) in Edo to their
mid-eighteenth century level as part of a larger attempt to suppress the lavish
spending of commoners and control the rampant inflation.  Following these reforms,
land and building rents both were reduced by 12% and 13% respectively.16) As a
result, land lost much of its value as an investment due to the difficulty of generating
stable and consistent profits from rents that were always in jeopardy of total loss from
Edo’s frequent fires.  At least, in the decades just before the Meiji Restoration, the
main purpose of owning lots was not to earn money by renting them to tenants.17)
If possessing urban property did not generate profits for its owners, then why did
wealthy merchant houses (o¯dana ) like Mitsui continue to own and buy lots in Edo’s
urban districts?  The main reason is that, in the Edo period, the ownership of a lot also
served as an important symbol of status and prestige among commoners.  Moreover,
wealthy merchant houses needed to own many lots to offer as collateral in large
commercial transactions with domain lords and the Tokugawa authorities.18)
Accordingly, wealthy merchant houses such as Mitsui continued to own between 80
and 100 lots throughout the city and continued to buy new lots or acquire lots from
smaller defaulting merchants throughout the economic and social upheavals of the
mid-nineteenth century.19)
3.  The Impact of the Meiji Government’s New Landowning Regime
As described above, land was not regarded as a target for investment in Tokyo at
the beginning of the Meiji Restoration.  Accordingly, prior to the reforms of the new
Meiji government, land-tenants ( jigari ) were able to reside stably on the same lot for a
uncertain period of time, usually more than one hundred years.
In 1873, however, the new government promulgated the Land Tax Reform (Chiso
kaisei ), which drastically shifted a landowner’s tax burden from the lot’s frontage
width to an assessment based on the total area of land.20) In part, this reform reflected
the new government’s desire to remove yamori from their middleman role in the
administration of the city and replace them with a system run directly by government
employees.  For example, residence registries (ninbetsucho¯), which had been based on
urban lots (machiyashiki ) and were frequently managed by a yamori, had since begun to
be organized through new lot numbers (chiban) assigned to all areas regardless of their
former boundaries and status distinction; retainer and domain lord areas (bukechi ),
temple and shrine areas ( jishachi ), and commoner areas (cho¯ninchi ).21)
Furthermore, the restrictions on rents since the Tenpo¯ Reforms were abandoned
altogether under an August 1872 proclamation by the Grand Council of State
(Dajo¯kan).22) Thereafter, the government left the setting of rent rates entirely to the
negotiation between each landowner and their tenant.  Unfortunately, previous
research on land ownership has focused mainly on agricultural villages, tenant
farmers, and absentee landlords, leaving the issue of tenancy and property in Japan’s
cities largely untouched.23) Therefore, while few details are known about the
subsequent negotiations of rents or the changing numbers of tenants owing to the
Land Tax Reform, it is certain that landowners began making efforts to earn greater
profits from their urban properties.
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“Earthquake Dealing” ( Jishin baibai)
Despite changes in laws and regulations, it remained difficult for landowners
( jinushi ) to earn profits from their land for another reason—rent collection.  Owing
that owners did not necessarily rent land for profit, it is perhaps not surprising that
landowners had not developed a reliable system of rent collection.  Moreover, an
urban district’s collective social system often forgave tenants who were from time to
time unable to either pay on time or in full (for further details see below).  For this
reason, with the change in laws, enterprising landowners began to take steps toward
creating a system of regular and reliable rent collection.
The first problem that they encountered was how to deal with the yamori.  Although
yamori had been relinquished of their semi-official administrative duties for the city
from 1869 onward,24) they still performed various functions, such as notifying residents
about new public proclamations and acting as the primary collectors of rent well into
the Meiji era.  Landowners, however, did their best to reduce their reliance on these
yamori.  Because the yamori lived for years amongst the same tenants in tightly knit
communities, they often found it very difficult to force their poorest tenants to pay
rents regularly and in full.  For this reason, the collection rate had been generally low
during the entire Edo period.25) Also, because the income of yamori derived more
income from the sale of their tenant’s nightsoil than from the salary they earned for
collecting their tenants’ rents, they remained largely unaffected by their employer-
landowner’s most obvious means of penalization—a deduction in their salary.26)
Following the 1873 Land Tax Reform and the austerity policies demanded by the
so-called Matsukata Deflation (1881–1885), however, land became a target for the
investment of assets, and new more reliable methods of collecting rents were
developed.  For example, Mitsui initially tried a strategy of hiring only yamori whose
collection rates were high, but eventually the company’s directors decided to establish
their own subsidiary rent-collection agency (sahai-jo) to which the company’s tenants
were obliged to directly pay their rents on a fixed day of every month.27)
Following this slow but steady process of reducing the role of the yamori, Tokyo’s
landowners also began to distinguish between the kinds of their land and building
tenants and to pressure them to pay higher rents or face the threat of eviction.
Nonetheless, even four decades after the Meiji Restoration, it was still widely
recognized that buildings were more valuable than land in Tokyo (see Figure 5).28)
Therefore, it remained socially unacceptable for landowners to give eviction notices to
land-tenants who had invested heavily in their buildings, such as the many venerable
merchant families living and operating their businesses for over one hundred years on
the same lots in central Tokyo.
Despite such circumstances, Tokyo’s new urban planning projects served the
interests of landowners by encouraging the creation of a new real estate management
business (fudo¯san-gyo¯).  In accord with new fire prevention regulations, in the mid-
1870s the Tokyo prefectural government (To¯kyo¯-fu) ordered that wood buildings along
several main streets in central Tokyo be reconstructed with fireproof stucco or brick
walls and required the replacement of all shingle and thatch roofing with fireproof
materials for the area of the Outer Moat.29) Landowners like Mitsui, for example, took
advantage of these projects to demand their tenants to improve their buildings or
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move out and even extended this expectation to tenants living outside the fireproofing
zone demarcated by the prefecture.30)
In addition, landowners took advantage of the inequities built into the new civil
code (minpo¯-ten) that was promulgated in 1896 and 1898.  Based on the liberal
philosophy written into the French and German civil codes, the provisions of Japan’s
civil code did not weight the particular circumstances of the individual parties
involved.  As such, in lease contracts disputes, the courts did not take into
consideration the power relationships between leaseholders, landowners, and building
owners (o¯ya), and their respective land and building tenants.31)
The Civil Code provided two kinds of rights in drawing up a contract for leased
land: surface rights and lending rights.  The actual situation was, however, that most
landowners preferred the latter method of contract because the duration of a contract
based on lending rights was less than twenty years and required the approval of the
landowner in order to sublet the property.  In fact, a lease agreement formulated and
used by Mitsui reveals that they limited the duration of their contracts to only five
years and, if Mitsui requested their removal, buildings had to be taken off the land
within 180 days.32) Taking advantage of people’s unfamiliarity with such contracts,
many landowners persuaded their tenants to sign new contracts and repeatedly
increased their rents.  When tenants refused to meet such demands, landowners
declared a breech of contract and demanded them to vacate the property
immediately.33)
Although it is difficult to grasp the entire picture, the Tokyo District Court alone
handled 392 instances of dispossession related to such rapacious practices between
1906 and 1908, and the number of disputes in this period is thought to be lower than
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Figure 5: Examples of jigari-buildings in the 1880s.（明治 18 年刊行『東京商工博覧絵』部分）
in other years.34) In response to the sudden disappearance of long-established stores
dating well back into the Edo period, contemporary newspapers began calling these
egregious evictions “earthquake dealing” ( jishin baibai ).35)
4.  “Earthquake Dealing” and the Restructuring of Space and Society in Tokyo
As described above, during the Edo period, land could not be a target for
investment due to the administrative role played by the urban district (cho¯) and the
existence of the yamori.  In the meantime, large merchant houses continued to
accumulate land for the purpose of proving their social prestige and status and to use
as guarantee in large commercial transactions.  After the new government’s reforms in
the 1870s, land acquired value as an asset because there were no longer restrictions on
rents and the new government’s basic policy on taxes was shifted from lot frontage to
the area of lot as a whole.  Under such circumstances, the significance of owning land
changed drastically.  Meanwhile, when the new government officially allowed the
general use of land in all commoner areas after 1868, many large merchant houses
subsequently became, and remain so today, large urban property holders based on
their Edo possessions.  In addition, some real estate corporations like Mitsui and
Sumitomo continued to use these properties as an effective means to accumulate
capital.36)
At the same time, many tenants who had long occupied and used the land suffered
due to the sudden increase in their rent and frequent loss of the right to tenancy (that
is, they were evicted).  This suffering was felt even more sharply by building tenants.
For instance, while land tenants eventually gained some protection under the law,
building tenants had to wait for decades before laws were enacted to protect their
tenancy rights.  In the meantime, “earthquake dealing” often forced the tenants of
buildings along central Tokyo’s backstreets and alleys to relocate to the urban
periphery, thereby contributing to Tokyo’s urban sprawl.37) As a result of “earthquake
dealing,” people of the urban lower-class who had been living in uradana along the
back alleys of Edo (see Figure 3) then congregated in slums in Tokyo’s new suburbs.
The rampant increase in “earthquake dealing” also discouraged land-tenants from
investing in large amounts of money to build high-quality buildings.  Moreover, as the
possession of land gained even more social prestige, land-tenants saw an equivalent
erosion of their social status.  According to a 1910 report that describes the conditions
of buildings along following the Tokyo City Improvement Projects (shiku-kaisei jigyo),
a number of shoddy pseudo-Western buildings appeared along the widened
Nihonbashi Avenue (the most prominent street in Tokyo at the time) to create an
uneven and unsightly townscape (see Picture 1).38) Although often explained as the
result of the diligent efforts of some long-established shop owners and a new rising
mass culture, this transformation should also be seen in light of the earthquake-
dealing’s destruction of the mixed local communities in the city center.39)
On the other hand, and in contrast to building tenants, a noteworthy fact is that
central Tokyo’s land-tenants proved to be both politically and socially more adept and
dealing with the changes with which they were confronted.  As mentioned above,
many land-tenants in central Edo were relatively wealthy wholesale or intermediate
merchants, who chose not to own the land on which their businesses thrived because
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they did not find a positive reason to do so.  In Edo, the basic social and
administrative unit of the urban district (cho¯) shaped (and at times hindered) how
various social and economic activities could be undertaken.  Following the Meiji
Restoration, though, the identity among land tenants of belonging to a particular
district in the commoner areas was gradually replaced with a broader mindset of
being a true-born “Edokko” (Edoite or Tokyoite) and of being a “Nihonbashi merchant.”
While government officials and the very wealthy, that is, those directly and indirectly
involved in “earthquake dealing,” continued to oppose all things “Edo,” a look at the
charter for the “Nihonbashi Club (Nihonbashi Kurabu)” (see Picture 2) epitomizes this
emergent local mindset and its potential as a source of identity from which to oppose
their disinvestment from the city center.40) Moreover, it is possible to see a direct
correlation between the establishment and activities of these groups and the progress
of city redevelopment projects.41)
Furthermore, from the 1890s, the founding and activities of land-tenant unions
began to exert considerable influence city politics, specifically, through both local and
national elections.  Until that time, much of the national government’s revenue had
been based on the land tax, which was naturally levied on landowners.  But in
response to the enormous financial burdens of the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895)
and later the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), in 1896 the national government
imposed a business tax (eigyo¯-zei ) and in 1904 instituted an extraordinary special tax
(hijo¯ji tokubetsu zei ), which by increasing the tax burden on wealthy merchants also
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Picture 1: Nihonbashi do¯ri after the urban planning project (Shiku-kaisei keikaku) in the 1900s: a
traditional machiya is sandwiched between pseudo-Western, shoddy buildings.
ironically gave them a greater stake in political decision making.  It also encouraged
many land tenants and their various associations in central Tokyo to express their
views and opinions at both the local and national levels of government.42)
Representatives of these groups attended sessions of the House of Representatives
from 1909 and succeeded in gaining passage of the Building Protection Law (Tatemono
hogo ho¯), which later became the current Land Lease and House Lease Law (Shakuchi-
shakka ho¯).  During the process of enacting the Building Protection Law, however, the
more conservative House of Peers led by supporters of landowners fought against the
adoption of new law and succeeded in removing some important clauses from it.  As a
result, it took an additional thirty years for land tenants to persuade the government to
allow contracts for a duration of several decades.43)
Amidst this decades-long conflict between landowners and their tenants, on
September 1, 1923 the Great Kanto Earthquake (Kanto¯ Daishinsai ) struck the Kanto
region, destroying much of Tokyo and its many communities of land tenants.  With
the decline of these tenants, their businesses, and their way of life, much of central
Tokyo lost its historic and characteristic vigor.  Nonetheless, the land-tenant based
communities that identified themselves as being true-born “Edokko” continued to
shape Tokyo’s development.  This legacy is perhaps most clearly seen in the
formation of the suburban garden city of Denencho¯fu, whose development had just
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Picture 2: The Nihonbashi Club (Nihonbashi Kurabu) building and members in the early 1900s.
The announcement on the right calls for is an advertisement for national
administration.  In this article, the Nihonbashi Club is sponsoring one of their
members, Takagi Masutaro¯, and describes him as an “Edokko” who will never bow to
those in the government and among the wealthy who are involved in “earthquake
dealing.”（『法律新聞』明治 41年 4月 20日号外）
started in the year of the great earthquake.  Although, directed by the wealthy
entrepreneur Shibusawa Eiichi, there is every possibility that much of the planning
and direction for this suburban community came from the land tenant merchants of
Nihonbashi area.44) Thus, as Tokyo expanded outward, the old land-tenant merchants
of the city center continued to play a significant role in the formation of the city’s new
suburbs.
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